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I. INTRODUCTION
More than 80,000 people are currently awaiting life-saving transplants in the United
States.2 Of those waiting, approximately eighteen people die every day.3 Only thirty-five to fifty
percent of all potential donors consent to donation, resulting in numerous wasted organs.4
Robert Noel Test summarizes the true value and benefits of organ donation in his poem, To
Remember Me:
The day will come when my body will lie upon a white sheet neatly tucked under four
corners of mattress located in a hospital busily occupied with the living and the dying.
At a certain moment a doctor will determine that my brain has ceased to function and that,
for all intents and purposes, my life has stopped.
When that happens, do not attempt to instill artificial life into my body by the use of a machine.
And don’t call this my deathbed. Let it be called the Bed of Life, and let my body be taken
from it to help others lead fuller lives.
Give my sight to the man who has never seen a sunrise, a baby’s face or love in the eyes of a
woman.
Give my blood to the teen-ager who was pulled from the wreckage of his car, so that he might
live to see his grandchildren play.
Give my kidneys to one who depends on a machine to exist from week to week.
Take my bones, every muscle, every fiber and nerve in my body and find a way to make a
crippled child walk.
Explore every corner of my brain. Take my cells, if necessary, and let them grow so that
someday, a speechless boy will shout at the crack of a bat and a deaf girl will hear the sound
of rain against her window.
Burn what is left of me and scatter the ashes to the winds to help the flowers grow.
If you bury something, let it be my faults, my weaknesses and all prejudice against my fellow man.
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Give my sins to the devil.
Give my soul to God.
If, by chance, you wish to remember me, do it with a kind deed or word to someone who needs you.
If you do all I have asked, I will live forever.5

All countries throughout the world vary in the way they procure organs, but they all have one
thing in common: there is a fatal organ shortage because all the systems countries have imposed
have failed. No procurement system in the world has been successful. Therefore, new
procurement systems need to be implemented and tested, particularly financial incentives or a
regulated organ market, to remedy these unnecessary and preventable deaths. This paper will
explore the failures of current organ procurement systems as well as alternative reform systems.
Part II provides a brief overview of the history of organ transplantation. Part III addresses the
reasoning behind the shortage of organs. Part IV examines organ transplantation legislation in
America, while Part V examines the varieties of legislation imposed abroad. Part VI discusses
six alternative procurement systems, including: (1) express donation; (2) presumed consent; (3)
conscription; (4) routine requests; (5) financial incentives; and (6) an organ market. Of these
systems, four have been tried and failed, but two (financial incentives and an organ market)
should be considered for trial.6 In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of the two
proposed systems are examined at length, as are the effect of the black market on organ donation,
the different types of organ sales, and the enhancement of donation through international
cooperation.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
Doctor Christiaan Barnard conducted the very first human heart transplant in South Africa on
December 2, 1967.7 This historic moment captured the attention of the entire world, and to this
day organ transplantation remains a topic that produces much literature and debate.8 Today,
hearts, kidneys, livers, pancreas, lungs, and other organs are transplanted on a regular basis.9
Organ transplantation has become an important treatment tool to save lives.10 Because
successful transplants provide a virtual rebirth and allow patients to return to full and productive
lives, they stand out as “one of the most significant medical advances of the past few decades.”11
Organ transplantation offers the most dramatic life-saving tool and promotes the notion that
through such heroic measures, we can overcome death and prolong precious life.12 Of course,
with organ transplantation comes the concept of organ procurement, which creates a huge public
policy dilemma because of the persistent shortage of organs.13 Since the advent of organ
transplantation, legislative and regulatory actions across the world have been adopted to increase
organ donation.14 However, to this day all proposals have “glaring[ly]” failed; actually, the
situation has continued to worsen.15 The following are examples of legislative attempts across
the world. Many prominent countries, including: Austria, France, Spain, Italy, Finland, Greece,
Brazil, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden, have enacted presumed consent laws.16 China has

7

GEORGE W. MILLER, MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 3 (Charles C. Thomas
1971).
8
Id.
9
KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 6, at 1-2.
10
Id. at 1.
11
Id. at 2.
12
NORA MACHADO, USING THE BODIES OF THE DEAD: LEGAL, ETHICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 5 (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Ashgate Publishing Company Limited
2003) (1998).
13
KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 6, at 2.
14
Id. at 3.
15
Id.
16
Troy R. Jensen, Organ Procurement: Various Legal Systems and their Effectiveness, 22 Hous. J. Int’l L. 555, 559
(2000). See also KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 6, at 46.

3

harvested organs from executed prisoners since 1984.17 For religious reasons, Japan and Iran do
not conduct organ transplants but rather import organs from other countries.18 The United States
passed the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) in 1984, containing a voluntary donation
policy as well as a prohibition on the sale of human organs.19 Consequently, there are no wellregulated commercial markets.20
III. THE SHORTAGE OF ORGANS
Symbolically, organ transplantation is such a powerful metaphor because of the true
metamorphosis that takes place.21 Transforming a deceased human being’s body part into an
implant for a living human being “implies the crossing of many boundaries, not only
physiological, but also cultural, legal and ethical ones.”22 The issues that arise from organ
transplantation limit the number of organs available and in turn increase the length of waiting
time, which can have serious negative consequences.23 From 1988 to 1995, the waiting time for
a kidney increased 141%.24 Increased waiting time has at least four substantial consequences:
(1) patient suffering is prolonged; (2) expense of keeping patients alive is considerably
increased; (3) patient health deteriorates and patients are less able to withstand an operation’s
physical stress as time passes; and (4) many patients die because they cannot get an organ within
a reasonable time frame.25 Statistics show that in 1997, a person waited on average 477 days for
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a liver;26 imagine spending a year and a half of your life wondering if you are going to live a
long and happy life, or if you are going to die waiting!
Indeed, an abundant supply of potential organ donors exists, but they do not donate for a
variety of reasons.27 In fact, one conservative review suggests that organ supply could more than
double if all potential donations were available for harvest.28 Consider that the following usable
organs and tissue are available from a single person:
Brain tissue
1 jaw bone for facial reconstruction
Bone marrow to treat leukemia and other diseases
1 heart
4 separate valves
2 lungs
1 liver
2 kidneys
Small and large intestines
206 separate bones, including long bones of the arms and legs for use
in limb reconstruction and ribs used in spinal fusion and facial repair
About 27 ligaments and cartilage used in rebuilding ankles, knee, hips
elbows and shoulder joints
2 corneas: to restore sight
2 each of the inner ear, the hammer, anvil and stirrup: to ameliorate
some forms of deafness
1 heart pericardium (can be used to cover the brain after surgery)
1 stomach (transplanted experimentally without much success)
1 pancreas (can restore insulin production in diabetes)
2 hip joints
Over 600,000 miles of blood vessels, mostly veins that can be
transplanted to re-route blood around blockages
Approximately 20 square feet of skin which can be used as temporary
cover for burn injuries29

Transplant recipients benefit from organ donation as do families of the deceased.30 A
Spanish study and a study by the Partnership for Organ Donation showed that eighty-five to
eighty-six percent of donor family members surveyed one year after the death of a loved one felt
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that the donation resulted as one positive outcome of the death, and eighty-nine to one hundred
percent would donate again.31 Of those family members who refused donation, thirty percent
would have changed their mind.32
While an overwhelming majority of Americans approve of organ donation, reasons for not
donating vary from religious purposes to personal reasons.33 Although public opinion surveys
indicate an overall willingness to authorize donation, most still refuse when actually confronted
with the situation.34 Grief or psychological and emotional stress may make the decision
extremely difficult.35 Deciding to donate means contemplating death in advance, something the
young do not think about; and most useful organs come from the unexpected deaths of young
accident victims.36 Another long-standing myth is that the medical profession may terminate an
organ donor’s life early or not try as hard to save the donor’s life so that doctors may harvest the
donor’s organs.37 However, a different medical team conducts the transplant operation, as
compared to the team that saves lives, and these doctors have no incentive to terminate life
early.38 Families of brain-dead patients also may not believe they are really dead because they
might still have color, a heartbeat, or functioning systems.39
Another common concern that families have is that organ donation may interfere with funeral
arrangements.40 However, the funeral industry refutes this argument by stating that no matter
what type of donation, customary burial arrangements are not interfered with, and open-casket
31
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funerals are still possible.41 The donation of hearts, lungs, kidneys, livers and pancreases
actually makes embalming a body much easier.42 When skin is donated, it comes from parts of
the body that are clothed during a funeral service, such as the stomach, or the skin can be painted
with a solution that restores the area.43 Only every other rib is harvested during rib donation, so
that the chest remains firm; large and small bones are typically replaced with prosthetics.44 Be
assured that there will be no complications surrounding the proper funeral and burial of an organ
donor.
The media also has a negative impact on the supply of organs.45 Transplant professionals
feel that adverse publicity tarnishes the image of transplantation and therefore generates more
refusals to consent.46 In 1980, a United Kingdom prime-time current affairs program questioned
the validity of brain-death criteria, and “it took 15 months for donor referral rates to recover.”47
Due in part to such negative publicity, Belgium and France, known for traditionally high organ
donation rates, have experienced decreased support.48 A French story indicated a failure fully to
inform family members of procurement procedures, and Belgium publicized the sizeable number
of nonresidents on national transplant waiting lists.49 In the United States, organ donation
receives a bad reputation when celebrities, most notably Mickey Mantle, receive organs days
after joining a waiting list, while others have waited for months, maybe even years.50 When
media coverage, which shapes the public’s perception of organ donation, publishes stories like
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this, people lose faith in the system.51 Most recently, organ trafficking rumors (mainly false)
have caused substantial damage to altruistic attitudes throughout the world because they embody
very potent fears.52
Religious views also greatly impact attitudes towards organ donation.53 However, most
established religions accept donation.54 While the Amish believe that God created the human
body and is therefore the one who heals it, there is nothing in the Bible that forbids them from
implementing modern medical services, such as surgery, blood transfusions, or
hospitalizations.55 Donation is highly supported by the Assemblies of God, the Pentecostal
Church, and the Christian Church.56 Baptists and Catholics support donation as an act of charity
and love but leave the decision up to each individual.57 Buddhists place high value on acts of
compassion but believe donation is of individual conscience.58 In addition, they honor those who
donate because they believe donation is a noble act.59 In 1982, the Episcopal Church passed a
resolution that recognized the life-giving benefits and encouraged donation as part of the
ministry to others.60 The Greek Orthodox Church does not oppose donation as long as it is used
to better human life.61 Hindus, Evangelicals, Pentecostals, and Mormons are not prohibited by
religious law, and the decision is left up to the individual.62 The Muslims strongly believe in the

51

Siegel, supra note 33, at 945.
Meeting the Organ Shortage, supra note 30.
53
Jennifer M. Krueger, Life Coming Bravely Out of Death: Organ Donation Legislation Across European
Countries, 18 Wis. Int’l L.J. 321, 335 (2000).
54
Id. at 336.
55
The Living Bank, Religious Views on Organ/Tissue Donation and Transplantation, at
http://www.livingbank.org/religiousviews.doc (last visited March 25, 2004) [hereinafter Religious Views].
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Krueger, supra note 53, at 336.
60
Religious Views, supra note 55.
61
Id.
62
Id.
52

8

notion of saving human lives.63 It is often assumed that Jehovah’s Witnesses are opposed to
donation because they do not believe in blood transfusions.64 However, donations are accepted if
the blood is removed from the organs or tissues before being transplanted; it would not be
acceptable to receive blood during the organ recovery.65 All four branches of Judaism encourage
donation.66 Although the burial of the dead should not be deferred or their bodies mutilated,
organ donation is considered an exception.

67

In fact, Orthodox Rabbi Moses Tendler stated that

it is obligatory to donate if one is in the position to save another’s life, even if the donor never
knows whose life he or she saved.68 Lutherans describe donation as sacrificial love for neighbors
in need.69 In 1995 during their General Assembly, Presbyterians wrote for strong support of
organ donations and encouraged members and friends to sign donor cards.70 In 1984 and 1992,
the United Methodist Church released donation policy statements encouraging Christians to sign
donor cards and encourage pastoral-care persons to explore donation options in conversations
with patients and their relatives.71
On the other hand, donation is not accepted by some religions.72 Gypsies tend to oppose
donation in connection with their beliefs about the afterlife: the soul retraces its steps for one
year after death and therefore must remain intact so the soul can maintain its physical shape.73
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The Shinto oppose donation because it injures the body, and Japanese are often worried about
damaging the “itai.”74
IV. LEGISLATION IN AMERICA
In 1968, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) was implemented in response to the need
to reform transplantation and donation.75 The UAGA was approved at the National Conference
of Commissioners, followed by the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American
Bar Association (ABA).76 All fifty states and the District of Columbia adopted some form of it
within five years.77 Under the act, individuals have “a legal right to determine the disposition of
their bodies,” which they can state in a number of ways.78 Wills, other documents, or a signed
driver’s license with two witnesses suffice as declarations.79 The UAGA defined, clarified, and
assisted the consent process by eliminating states’ inconsistencies.80 However, despite the
UAGA’s good intentions, doctors, procurement organizations, and hospitals generally reject
these gifts without receiving approval from the decedent’s family, because participant harvesters
do not want to be subject to liability.81
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In 1977, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), originated by the South-Eastern
Organ Procurement Foundation, developed the first computerized system that matched donors
with candidates.82 UNOS has many tasks: increasing public awareness, maintaining the wait
list, coordinating matches of donors and candidates, collecting and reporting transplantation data,
providing a forum for policy creation to maximize the use of organs, establishing training and
experience criteria for physicians, providing professional education, and producing
transplantation information to everyone.83 UNOS is under contract with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Services & Resources Administration
(HRSA) and links all transplant centers and organ procurement organizations to a centralized
computer system.84 Transplant centers evaluate referrals from other doctors by conducting tests,
considering the physical and mental health of the patient, and viewing his or her social support
system.85 If the patient is deemed a transplant candidate, his or her name goes into the pool of
waiting patients, but the patient does not yet achieve rank.86 When an organ becomes available,
a transplant coordinator from a procurement organization accesses the UNOS network via
computer and enters donor characteristics, which are then compared to the patients in the pool.87
The computer ranks patients from the pool according to organ allocation policies with each
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procured organ.88 Blood type, tissue match, waiting time, distance between the donor and the
patient, and the immune status are all considered.89 For livers, hearts, and intestines, the
patient’s medical urgency is additionally considered.90 The organ is then offered to the patient
ranked first on the list; however, the top patient may not receive the organ.91 Patients must be
available immediately, willing, and healthy enough to undergo a major surgery.92 As of March
16, 2004, the UNOS wait lists stands as follows:
57,053 registrations for a kidney transplant
17,249 registrations for a liver transplant
1,559 registrations for a pancreas transplant
2,394 registrations for a kidney-pancreas transplant
184 registrations for an intestine transplant
3,460 registrations for a heart transplant
185 registrations for a heart-lung transplant
3,909 registrations for a lung transplant
84,001 TOTAL PATIENTS93

(The number of total patients is less than the sum of all registrations because some patients are in
need of more than one organ.)94 Nonetheless, these figures represent an astronomical number of
patients in tremendous need.
The 1968 UAGA’s good-faith efforts to increase the supply of organs were not as effective
as Congress had hoped, so it created a new national health policy, the National Organ Transplant
Act (NOTA), in 1984.95 NOTA was an effort to establish a more comprehensive network of
organ procurement while raising public awareness of the great need.96 NOTA implemented a
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number of tactics in Congress’s second failed attempt at increasing organ supply.97 These tactics
included creating a procurement system (the National Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network), creating funding through federal grants to organ procurement agencies, implementing
a national scientific registry of transplant recipients, establishing the Task Force on Organ
Transplantation (Task Force), and prohibiting the purchase or sale of organs.98 While Congress
had good intentions, the organ shortage remains.99
The federal government passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986 in
an effort to make all states uniform in requiring some kind of request, whether they had state
statutes or not.100 While the OBRA supersedes state law, states are allowed to establish harsher
requirements; however, some states have not established any at all.101 This response to the Task
Force report in 1986 required routine inquiry protocols by hospitals with the minimum being to
inform the patient or family member of the donation opportunity, to allow hospital personnel to
waive this requirement when uncomfortable with the situation, and to identify possible donors
and notify organ procurement agencies of these potentials.102
In 1987, a revamped Uniform Anatomical Gift Act was issued in a fourth effort to increase
organ supply.103 This UAGA prohibits the sale of organs, decreases the formal requirements on
donation intent, eliminates the two-witness requirement, describes methods for refusing gifts,
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and gives the donor’s intent priority over any family objections.104 This model also includes
required request provisions and routine inquiry.105
Various problems in the United States that hinder organ donation have been noted in a recent
study conducted by the Hastings Center.106 Problems include but are not limited to failure to
sign intent to donate directives, failure of police and emergency personnel to find directives at
the site of accidents, public uncertainty about organ recovery, failure to approach family
members systematically, and failure to obtain sufficient informed consent from the decedent’s
family.107 In sum, “major flaws . . . include the lack of incentive for people to donate their
organs and for attending physicians or nurses to perform the unpleasant task of soliciting organs
from mourning families.”108 All organ procurers essentially have to rely on is “the appeal to the
donors’ (and their families’) sense of community, altruism, and benevolence.”109
V. LEGISLATION ABROAD
The Council of Europe, comprised of forty members, attempts to harmonize members’ laws
by promoting the adoption of common practices and standards through bringing together
ministers, parliamentarians, international organizations, and government experts to share their
experiences and expertise with one another.110 The Council of Europe commonly holds
conventions on the health and human rights of the public.111 The Council has made many efforts
to coordinate organ donation and has narrowed the problem down to four main concerns: (1)
ensuring the good quality of the organs; (2) promoting donation and reducing the black markets;
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(3) ensuring the fair allocation of the organs; and (4) funding research for future improvement.112
The Council of Europe continues attempting to coordinate organ donation, but has not yet
implemented a system including all of its members.113
The European Union (EU) promotes social progress, a solid economy, and unity amongst its
European member states.114 The ability to coordinate organ donation legislation is important
because the EU only has powers the European Union Constitution explicitly granted it.115
Members demand that they retain their own identities, so the Union’s powers to govern are
viewed narrowly.116 Therefore, the Union is constrained in passing legislation because it is not
allowed to violate any individual state’s laws in the process, making it extremely difficult to
coordinate organ donation laws.117
There is now a “strong international consensus” that until alternatives such as
xenotransplantation become available, every effort shall be made to maximize organ
procurement.118 However, the member states of the Council of Europe and the EU contradicted
their efforts by prohibiting the use of body parts for financial gain in Articles 20 and 21 of the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.119 This statement was an attempt to eliminate
the possibility of coercion and organ trafficking, which pose serious ethical dilemmas.120 The
statement also eliminates the possibility of a lawful and regulated market, which, if properly
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controlled, would help safely procure organs of better quality.121 The World Health
Organization (WHO) also condemned trading human organs by asking member nations to
oppose organ trafficking.122
Uniformity is lacking in the worldwide legal situation of organ transplantation.123 In fact, in
some countries, including: Germany, Iceland, The Netherlands, Ireland, Malta, and
Liechtenstein, no legal provisions exist whatsoever.124 Where legislation does exist, substantial
discrepancies are found, including the regulation of living and postmortem organ donation, organ
trade and penalization, definitions of brain death, and cadaveric organ donation.125
Organ trading systems differ substantially throughout the world regarding centralization
(working together with other countries in a regulated organ exchange effort).126 Some reasons
for these variations include the following factors: (1) scope (such as regional, national, or
supranational); (2) number of people served; (3) type of management (such as by professionals,
health administrators, or a mixture of both); (4) structure (such as non-profit foundations, state
agencies, or private agencies); (5) a centralized or decentralized organization; (6) responsibilities
and objectives (such as organ sharing, exchange, and procurement); and (7) activities (such as
organs, tissues, bone marrow, or some combination).127 Centralization is a key issue in a
country’s optimal goals for organ procurement. Eurotransplant, a highly centralized
organization, consists of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Slovenia, and the
Netherlands.128 This international collaborative foundation oversees more than 118 million
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inhabitants.129 More than 75 transplant hospitals are participating, and the joint international
wait list is approximately 15,000 patients.130 Eurotransplant’s goal is to optimize the use of
available organs by combining the countries’ efforts.131 Spain, on the other hand, features a
decentralized system that procures and transplants most organs locally.132 In between with
mixed centralization are the United States (UNOS) and the Scandinavian countries
(Scandiatransplant).133 There is no single, universal model because of the struggle between two
morally sound pro-and-con arguments: focusing on the “local community” versus considering
“those who may be geographically disadvanted.”134 While the universal goal is to optimize
procurement of organs, no one system predominates.135
VI. ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS
While worldwide literature on organ procurement is extremely broad, a review of it offers
at least six alternative policies: (1) express donation; (2) presumed consent; (3) conscription; (4)
routine requests; (5) financial incentives; and (6) an organ market.136 Of these six policies, four
have already been used throughout the world and have done nothing to better the situation.137
However, two policies (financial incentives and an organ market) have not been tested.138
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Analysis of these two systems shows encouraging possibilities and a possible direction for
countries throughout the world.139
The United States National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws found
these main competing interests in a decedent’s body: (1) the deceased’s wishes during his
lifetime; (2) the wishes of the next of kin or surviving spouse; (3) the state’s interest in
determining the cause of death in crime or violence cases; (4) the ability to determine the cause
of death where private legal rights are dependent upon it; and (5) medical education, therapy,
research, and transplantation.140 Attempts at balancing these interests have produced a variety of
procurement systems, which are discussed below.
A. Express Donation
First, express donation, a method used in the United States, is founded on the concept of
altruism.141 Under this theory, organ sales are illegal and therefore there is no incentive for the
doctors to request the organs, nor is there incentive for the donors to supply them, other than the
selflessness of the donor.142 Our current laws are codified in the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA), making it a felony to sell or buy organs for transplantation purposes.143 Many writers
in the field of organ donation assume that our current altruistic system was chosen by a
conscious, formal, policy selection process.144 Rather, instead of being chosen by thorough
evaluation and selection between competing choices, express donation was more of a “historical
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accident.”145 The earliest transplants were performed with live donors’ kidneys; cadaveric
donation was not yet technologically advanced.146 In essence, candidates would bring their donor
with them to the hospital, and if he or she did not have a donor, there was no transplant
operation.147 Therefore, no waiting lists or shortages existed.148 In this system, payment was
unnecessary for cooperation because the kinship between donors and recipients was considered
sufficient motivation.149 If kinship was not enough, payment could be arranged behind closed
doors.150 In sum, altruism made sense in this setting because the system solely relied on living
donors; however, with the advancement of medical technology came cadaveric organ donation
and improved transplant success.151 Waiting lists emerged in the 1970s when transplant
candidates began hoping for cadaveric organs.152 Despite drastic changes in the organ donation
situation, the early-inherited altruism policy has never been systematically evaluated or even
questioned.153
The altruistic system was secured without any serious inquiry regarding its effectiveness
when NOTA was passed in 1984.154 The act was actually passed in response to a specific
situation: a physician attempted to broker live donor kidneys in an effort to alleviate the growing
organ shortage.155 The medical community was outraged and rebutted by adamantly defending
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altruism, which created political pressure that ultimately forced Congress to pass this
legislation.156
In sum, while the situation has worsened, the policy remains the same as it was in the
beginning: the “root cause” of our organ shortage.157 It is important to note that this system has
failed every year “for at least the past thirty years,” and expected waiting times for organs have
increased from months to years.158 The list continues to grow, but the amount of organs
available does not.159 Repeated miniscule changes, such as increasing spending to promote
donor education, have subsequently failed, and extreme necessity calls for extreme reform.160
B. Presumed Consent
Second, presumed consent provides that there is no objection to the removal of organs
unless the potential donor or a family member objects.161 This is a weak alternative for increased
transplantation because it allows the donor or family to refuse organ donation merely by stating
an objection.162 It appears that presumed consent would not be acceptable to the American
public because “silence mean[ing] consent is no longer universally accepted and is considered
particularly loathsome.”163 Presumed consent countries include: France, Spain, Italy, Belgium,
Finland, Greece, Norway, and Sweden.164
Every country with presumed consent laws has its own standards. France passed the Law
of France No. 76-1181, also known as the Caillavet Law, in 1976 after the French legislature
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acknowledged a growing kidney shortage.165 This law provides that organs can be removed
from one who has not made known his refusal, but organ removal must be authorized by the
legal representative of a minor or mentally defective person.166 The Council of State, France’s
highest judicial advisory body, decided that a donor’s family cannot stop the removal of the
donor’s organs where he or she did not object while alive.167 Despite this decision, if families so
object, physicians will rarely remove the organs.168 Belgium has a central registry accessible to
all transplant centers where objections can be registered and is connected to information
campaigns that educate the public as well as health care professionals.169 Belgium, like France,
allows the removal of organs without familial consent, but Belgian doctors are allowed to inform
families of the objection option and ask if they object.170
C. Conscription
Third, conscription is simply “the strongest form of presumed consent,” where at best
even the donor cannot object to organ removal.171 James F. Childress was vice chair of the
National Task Force on Organ Transplantation and has served on the UNOS Ethics Committee
and the UNOS Board of Directors.172 Childress, known for his alternative organ procurement
policy ethics discussions, mentions four moral principles that should govern biomedical ethics:
(1) respect for persons, their choices, and actions; (2) beneficence and maximizing good
consequences; (3) one’s obligation not to inflict harm (nonmalfeasance); and (4) justice and the
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fair distribution of benefits and burdens.173 Childress concludes that conscription violates
individual autonomy and respect for persons’ principles and is therefore ethically
unacceptable.174
Indeed, while conscription could substantially increase organ collection rates, it receives
the least support.175 Where presumed consent with the right to object is highly problematic,
surely no choice at all would meet extreme opposition.176 In addition, the U.S. Constitution
prohibits taking a person’s property, which would include organs, without compensation.177
Chaos could result where families with strong opposition refuse to take their loved ones off life
support until the organs can no longer be used or even refuse to take terminally ill family
members to the hospital.178 These dodging strategies, accompanied with the costs of
enforcement, “could make matters even worse.”179
Austrian law provides that doctors may remove organs any time the deceased has not
made their objection known, without consulting family members, and can even ignore a family
member’s objection.180 The objection must also be in writing to be legal and, unlike in France,
the doctor has no duty at all to reasonably try to find such writings.181 As a result, Austria has
twice the procurement rate the United States does.182 However, opponents argue that the harsh
laws are not the reason for the success, because if this were the case, procurement rates in
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Austria would exceed other countries in all organ categories.183 This is not the case; compared to
France and Belgium (other presumed consent countries), Austria only has slightly higher liver
harvest rates and actually has lower heart harvest rates.184 Still, with the most stringent of
requirements and a slightly increased harvest rate in some categories, Austria experiences an
organ deficit despite its harsh presumed consent laws.185
D. Routine Requests
Fourth, routine requests require everyone to make his or her wishes known at some point,
and then all preferences are recorded with a central registry.186 It is not necessary for hospital
personnel to seek permission from the donor or to consult the decedent’s family during a time of
mourning; this results in organ donation being “more widely known and accepted in society”
because everyone must decide whether to donate.187 While this theory seems like a good idea,
almost ten years of data do not indicate any substantial impact on the situation, nor does it
indicate that this policy has the capacity to eliminate our shortage.188 In a similar sense, required
referral provides that hospitals must notify associated procurement organizations of all deaths.189
While this policy has deleted all failure to identify potential donors, it has not had any significant
effect on organ collection.190
E. Financial Incentives
A fifth alternative procurement system is the use of financial incentives.191 Unlike
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the previously mentioned systems, instead of alleviating the “failure-to-ask problem,” the
compensation approach directly asks organ donors to agree by choice.192 The appeals of altruism
and human kindness can still apply, with some financial payment or compensation in addition.193
Studies actually show that compensation has fairly widespread support among American
citizens.194 In a United Network for Organ Sharing survey, fifty-two percent of Americans were
in favor of compensation, only five percent had reservations, and a miniscule two percent
considered financial compensation “immoral or unethical.”195 While no effective trials or tests
have taken place, support for compensation has been evident since 1991, when a member of the
medical community, Thomas Peters, produced an article in the Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA) arguing for a sensitively offered compensation rate of $1,000 per donor.196
In 1994, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association
(AMA) created a pilot program that would evaluate the impact financial incentives had on organ
supply, but the program was never implemented.197
In June 2003, members of the AMA testified before Congress regarding organ donation
motivation and encouraged the study of financial incentives.198 The AMA listed a number of
possible motivations, including: future contracts allowing a tax credit of up to $10,000 for the
estate of the deceased donor, funeral expenses reimbursement, medals of honor, direct payment,
and charitable donations.199 The AMA hopes that this study will help it learn what motivates
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donors in an effort to increase organ supply.200 However, the AMA does note that before this
pilot study is implemented a few considerations should first be met: the population where the
study is to take place should be consulted in advance and advice should be solicited; protocols
regarding time frames, design, objectives, and strategies should be made available to the public
and approved by authoritative bodies (such as the Institutional Review Boards); incentives
should remain at the lowest level that would still increase organ donation; payment should not be
part of this study; and incentives should not lead to the purchase of organs.201 Needless to say,
such an authoritative and respected association urging the financial incentives options truly
shows what an appropriate option it is.
Other possible incentives include college education benefits or death benefit payments.202
Dr. Thomas G. Peters proposed a pilot program in which UNOS would offer $1,000 to the
family of organ donors, a sum the family could refuse.203 In these situations, the incentive would
not be offered until the donor was declared brain dead, and the incentive would not be paid until
after the harvest of the organ or organs.204 This token offer would not violate the notion of
altruism because $1,000 is not enough to be coercive to grieving families.205 While financial
incentives would also involve a change in laws, this death benefits system does not involve the
kind of compensation that Congress intended to prohibit by implementing NOTA’s prohibition
on organ sales, and therefore death benefits are not necessarily precluded.206
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F. An Organ Market
1. Introduction
The sixth system, a lawfully regulated organ market, has never been tested; however, much
has been written in favor of this option. As noted earlier, NOTA, sponsored by U.S. Senator Al
Gore, criminalized organ selling and purchasing.207 While this seemingly harmless act was a
valiant attempt at promoting altruism, prohibiting the use of the body as a commodity, and
preventing exploitation and abuse of the system, these benefits were not accurately weighed
“against the thousands of Americans dying on waiting lists who were sacrificed for these
ideals.”208 Within the parameters of this law, there will never be enough organs.209 “Like it or
not, our world is driven not by a common brotherhood or uninhibited desire to promote welfare
of a fellow human, but by other motivations.”210 As for the body being treated as a commodity,
why not? Individuals can sell almost anything else legally so long as it can reproduce, including
reproductive tissues and blood plasma.211 These regulated systems have worked well and proved
to be quite beneficial; they could be used as a leading example in the start of a free market. In
essence, the possibility of exploitation is “overestimated.”212 The United States’ attempt at the
prohibition of alcohol is a prime example: discrimination, corruption, and exploitation are
greatest in the realm of a black market, preventing capitalism from “equalizing certain
barriers.”213
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2. The Market Process
A minimum of five groups would be seriously affected by an organ market: (1) current and
potential transplant candidates; (2) actual and potential organ donors and their families; (3)
hospitals, physicians, and other transplant caregivers; (4) The United Network for Organ
Sharing, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, and other organ procurement
organizations; and (5) taxpayers and those who finance patient care.214 First, the organ supplier
(potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price,
which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand.215 Price flexibility would eliminate
surpluses or shortages automatically.216 Organ procurement firms would then remove the organs
at death and sell them to transplant centers that have put in an organ order.217 In turn, the centers
would include the price paid to the firm in the operation bill, with the resale price being the price
paid to the donor plus the firm’s collection and distribution cost.218 From here, the center could
allocate the organs in “precisely the same fashion they are allocated today” under the guidelines
of the UNOS.219 The firms acquiring the organs for sale would presumably operate
competitively on a for-profit basis, resulting in powerful market incentives to create and use the
best strategies in finding potential donors and encouraging them to donate.220 Procurement
agencies currently operate on a nonprofit basis, and while they may work diligently, it is
doubtful they could match the performance of the competitive for-profit firms.221
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The procurement agencies would act as middlemen.222 This middleman will use market
incentives in order to obtain organs, and regulation of this entity will ensure rights are not
violated.223 The entity would have a valid license to purchase organs from willing organ sellers;
only it would be able to buy organs.224 The entity would also be the only source from which a
patient could obtain organs, except in cases of altruistic gifts from one living donor to another.225
Willing individuals would contract with the procurement agency allowing for the removal of his
or her organs for a monetary fee.226 Following the death of the contracting individual, the organs
would be removed and the data would enter a central registry computer network in order to
match the procured organs with potential donees.227 The organs would be distributed
accordingly, with distribution determined on need-based criteria, not monetary gain.228 This
theory would not allow the wealthy to outbid others, thus eliminating black market tendencies.229
3. Market Support
The human organ market debate is “emotionally charged” and often misunderstood, and
therefore the proposal must be clarified.230 Advocates do not propose allowing agents to bargain
for organs on street corners or stand in hospitals waiting to badger the families of the recently
deceased.231 There would be no auction where desperate people bid against each other.232
Instead of using prices to distribute organs, prices would be used merely to collect organs.233
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Numerous proposals have been made and debates launched over the legalization of an
organ market. Public awareness of the contemplated sale of organs began in 1983, when H.
Barry Jacobs created the International Kidney Exchange Ltd, in which an indigent Third World
resident would set a price for a kidney, Jacobs would sell it and collect a brokerage fee.234 While
this idea initially generated tremendous hostility,235 more reasonable proposals have been made.
In June 1998, the International Forum for Transplant Ethics, including physicians from the
United States, England, Canada, and Oman, proposed that trade should not be banned, but
regulated.236 Reasons for regulation include the fact that the rich can play dangerous sports for
pleasure and work dangerous jobs for high pay, so the poor should be able to take lesser risks in
selling their kidneys (arguing that kidney removals have an extremely low medical risk) for even
larger rewards than pleasure or money, such as saving a family member’s life or removing
themselves from poverty.237 Doctors also argued that exploitation does not occur with the legal
sale but from the abuse that occurs from desperately wanted goods being made illegal, and a
central purchasing system would oversee the sales as well as counsel, screen, and provide other
related services.238 Regarding altruism, their argument is that if it is satisfactory for a father to
give his child a kidney, it should be acceptable for him to sell his kidney to pay for a life-saving
operation for his child.239
4. Market Opposition
Prominent international bodies such as the Council of Europe, the Transplantation
Society, the World Health Organization, and the World Health Assembly view commodification
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of body parts as “unacceptable.”240 Italy was the first jurisdiction to regulate it in 1969, and an
overwhelming number of countries have followed its lead.241 The World Medical Association
issued a statement condemning the purchase and sale of organs in 1985 and again in 2000.242
Opposition arguments vary from moral and ethical notions to practical and procedural
objections.243 This portion of the comment discusses the following arguments: (1) organ sales
subject organ vendors to harm; (2) sales would be damaging to altruism and social solidarity; (3)
vendors’ consent would be invalid; (4) vendors would be coerced into selling their organs; (5)
vendors would be exploited; and (6) there would be abuse of the system.244
a. Excessive Harm to Organ Vendors
Those who oppose organ sale argue that it is wrong because it subjects organ vendors to
risk and pain; it is harmful.245 If performed under good conditions, organ removal is not terribly
dangerous.246 In fact, studies show a mortality rate after kidney removal of about 0.03%, which
could be reduced even more by carefully choosing donors and taking thorough prophylactic
measures.247 The best way to avoid harm to vendors is also to accept and regulate organ sale
instead of criminalizing it and driving sales underground.248 This argument is based on previous
debates regarding the prohibition of drugs, abortion, and prostitution.249 Next, paying for organ
donation does not make it any more dangerous than unpaid donation; the mere fact of payment is

240

AUSTEN GARWOOD-GOWERS, LIVING DONOR ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: KEY LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 167
(Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Ashgate Publishing Company 1999).
241
Id. at 167-168.
242
STEPHEN WILKINSON, BODIES FOR SALE: ETHICS AND EXPLOITATION IN THE HUMAN BODY TRADE 104-105
(Routledge 2003).
243
See generally Id.
244
See generally Id.
245
Id. at 107.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
WILKINSON, supra note 242, at 108.
249
Id.

30

irrelevant in this sense.250 In addition, with a mortality rate estimated at 0.03%, the harm factor
is considerably less for a kidney donation than numerous dangerous and high-risk occupations,
such as: mining, construction work, or deep sea diving.251 For these reasons, the harm argument
must fail.
b. The Damage of Altruism and Social Solidarity
Altruism is defined as “acting out of disinterested concern for the well-being of
others.”252 Acting beneficently and promoting others’ welfare is inherently good and should be
contrasted with bad motivations such as selfishness.253 Altruism has positive effects on
individuals as well as a society, and certainly a society with more altruistic acts would be
superior.254 The blatant conclusion here, though, is that altruism alone has failed miserably at
producing enough organs.255 Paid and unpaid donation could actually peacefully coexist, and
therefore organ sale may not reduce the amount of altruism in the world.256 Indeed, in the United
Kingdom (U.K.) where the free blood donation service is extremely successful, altruism is a
strong argument.257 As for successful free donation, there is no “substantial pre-existing system
to be undermined.”258 Even if promoting altruism is good, it does not justify the killing of
patients who need transplants or depriving the vendors of money they so desperately need.259
c. The Organ Vendor’s Consent Would be Invalid
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Three crucial elements must be present for consent to be considered valid: information,
competence, and voluntariness.260 The main issue in organ sales is voluntariness versus financial
gain.261 The opposition argues that financial incentives persuade people to do things they would
not voluntarily do; however, this still does not create a consent problem.262 This is the whole
point: to encourage people to donate who would not otherwise.263 If consent problems arose
every time someone was encouraged financially, then these problems would be “endemic.”264
Consent problems could arise in instances such as India’s black market, where there is undue
influence against one’s autonomy and freedom.265 However, legalizing the sale of organs would
most likely decrease if not eliminate this Indian black market coercion.266 People still have the
choice to pass up the money; autonomy is defined by the ability to make a choice.267
d. Organ Vendors Would Be Coerced into Selling their Organs
As mentioned earlier, there are some cases in which individuals are coerced, by threats of
violence or death, into selling their organs.268 “Coercion worries are by no means confined to
commercial transplantation,” making it hard to make a coercion argument that does not entail the
condemnation of not only sale but also free donation.269 A properly regulated commercial
market would not involve any more coercion than free donation does.270 Coercive sales could
also be screened out by decriminalizing organ sale and implementing a regulatory body.271 A
prime example is the U.K.’s Unrelated Live Transplant Regulatory Authority (ULTRA), which
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requires that doctors explain in-depth the risks and procedures, and a qualified person thoroughly
interviews both the donor and the recipient separately to ensure there is no coercion and
everything is understood.272 While the U.K. uses this process to screen out inducement cases,
certainly this regulation would be appropriate in a commercial market.273
e. Organ Vendors Would be Exploited
Exploitation is “the single most important and widely deployed moral concept in the
body commodification debate.”274 Many commercial practices, in addition to organ sale, such as
prostitution and paid surrogacy, have been subject to attack by this moral concept.275
Exploitation, in this sense, would occur when organ purchasers wrongfully take advantage of
organ sellers (mainly the poor).276 However, exploitation in organ sales could be eliminated by
one small gesture: setting a minimum fee.277 The purchasers would not be able to take unfair
advantage of the poor and many benefits could result for some of the poorest people
worldwide.278 Exploitation is not only limited to the sale of organs, it also occurs in any event in
which treatment is unfair.279 Common situations, such as roadside vehicle-repair services or
emergency-room doctor care, could be considered exploitative if customers were overcharged or
received unsatisfactory service.280 The key element is the unfairness imposed; setting a
minimum fee would neutralize the exploitation by eliminating unfairness.281
f. Practical and Procedural Objections
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The opposition believes compensation could be wasted when organs are not suitable for
transplantation, especially in a futures market since many cadaver organs are not suitable for
transplant.282 Wasting compensation could be avoided, however, by conducting extensive tests
to ensure the organs would be suitable for transplantation.283 In addition, organ buyers could
reserve payment until the person died and the organs were determined transplantable.284 Another
argument is that the organs would be of poorer quality; for example, persons with health,
alcohol, or drug problems will be those most likely to be willing to sell their organs.285 Again,
extensive testing to determine the quality of organs and to prohibit the sale of low-quality organs
is a solution.286 Abuse of the system has also posed a dilemma: organ sellers could be tempted
to try to sell their organs more than once by using different names.287 However, a centralized
system used worldwide would remedy this abuse.288
5. Types of Organ Sales
a. The Black Market
This form of organ sale is certainly the most disturbing.289 Markets are a place to trade
commodities, and when the government bans goods being traded (or the sale of organs in this
case), the supplies of products are limited, the prices are high, and the demand is even higher.290
Several countries, including India, Israel, Brazil, and the Philippines, have reported stolen body
parts from living hospital patients and cadavers.291 India’s black market is infamously known for
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the sale of kidneys, although organ sale was made illegal in 1995.292 Live donors sell their
kidneys for less than $2,000, “a bargain for a rich American or European, but a sizeable sum
considered from the perspective of a slum dweller living in poverty.”293 Amritsar (northern
India), a major center for organ trade, is where local government colludes with traffickers, and
victims are subject to torture sometimes if they do not comply.294 Also, moneylenders have
reportedly forced debt-ridden people into selling organs.295 Consent issues include coercion,
misleading, under-informing, and being forced by poverty to surrender kidneys.296 However,
India is not alone; organ trafficking from Moldova (eastern Europe) to Israel through Turkey is
extensive.297
Much can be learned from the alcohol Prohibition era from 1919 to 1933 in the United
States.298 After the government banned exporting, importing, producing, and selling alcohol,
underground trading of alcohol began, resulting in the increase of crime and violence.299 Gangs
became involved in the sale and benefited richly, and, as with any money-making business, the
great profit created competition.300 Obviously, the gang members showed a blatant disregard for
the laws of the nation and did whatever was necessary to get rid of their competition.301
With the sale of alcohol already illegal, sales were no longer limited to adults only, and
prices skyrocketed with such great demand while the safety and quality of the alcohol
diminished.302 People secretly manufactured alcohol in their homes, and without the assistance
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and inspection by the government, the number of deaths caused by alcohol poisoning increased
dramatically.303 It was not until the government repealed Prohibition that the black market
finally disappeared.304 With the forbidding of organ sales in every nation in the world, similar to
the forbidding of alcohol sales, a black market has erupted.305 While the rumors of events
occurring as a result of the black market are terrifying, a possible solution to destroy the black
market is to legalize the sale of organs and increase the supply, as was accomplished with the
legalization of alcohol sales.306
b. Commercial Market of a Deceased’s Organs
Cadaver organs (taken from a deceased donor) are the largest source of organs.307 These
donors have to be dead, and issues arise because definitions of death differ. In addition, while
someone may be deceased, they may artificially appear to still be alive, which creates uncertainty
for the family members.308 The Uniform Determination of Death Act recognizes two
determinations of death: (1) when circulatory and respiratory functions cease; and (2) when the
brain ceases to function.309 Although the brain dies, the person may still appear to be alive;
however, the body cannot function as a whole and will perish without some means of life
support.310 These distinctions are important when it comes to the donation of organs.

A brain-

dead donor’s organs can be maintained artificially for hours or days if necessary before being
harvested, thus increasing the opportunity for acceptable donation organs.311
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On the other hand, when the respiratory and circulatory functions cease, there are two
scenarios: (1) a controlled setting where the donor is terminally ill and the decision is made to
turn off the life support; (2) an uncontrolled setting, such as when the donor goes into cardiac
arrest during surgery and dies.312 In the first scenario, organ donation is premeditated and can be
carried out in a regulated and planned procedure.313 In the second instance, events may be
chaotic and rushed, leaving the physician with barely any time to organize an organ donation.314
In either scenario, the organs must be harvested immediately because the organs will die
soon after the blood stops circulating and the heart stops beating.315 This small window inhibits
the opportunity to arrange for donation,316 but if the donor had already sold his or her organs
during his or her lifetime, the only step left in organizing the donation would be to find a suitable
donee. The process of inquiring whether the deceased was a donor or not, or asking the family to
make such an important decision, would already be completed, thus creating more time to
harvest and donate the organ. This notion, also known as the futures market, allows a person to
sell, during his life, the right to remove his organs upon death.317 The organ provider would
enter into a contractual relationship with an organ buyer, whether it be a single private entity, a
governmental agency, or competing government and private entities.318 Issues in this proposed
system are the timing of the payments (paying the donor during his life or after his death) and the
price of the organs (if the market forces will be determinative).319 This system would allow only
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the donor to sell his own organs, upholding the notion of individual bodily autonomy while
preventing reliance on live organ bearers.320
c. Commercial Market of a Living Donor
In 1999, eBay discovered and immediately removed from its website the offer of a kidney
for sale.321 The Florida seller offered a functioning kidney and by the time eBay intervened,
“bidding had already started at $25,000 and risen dramatically to more than $5,700,000.”322 This
evidence only promotes the notion that United States citizens may be willing to accept a
commercial market.323
Most often, living donors choose to donate to family members or close friends in need.324
When there are few matches, pressure may overcome the potential donor and affect his or her
autonomous decision.325 With autonomy gone already and pressure weighing heavily, financial
incentives or organ sales should do nothing but help move along the decision-to-donate process.
No matter what scenario, the harvesting of living donors’ organs has saved numerous precious
lives.326 The doctor’s job is to act in the patient’s best interest, and critics note that taking the
organ out of a healthy donor and putting him or her at harm is not in the patient’s best
interests.327 However, this argument can be refuted in a couple of ways: (1) as stated earlier,
due to advancements in medical technology, risks are extremely low, especially if a donor enters
the operation in good health; and (2) even arguments of pain, possible injury, or negative
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psychological consequences can be refuted by the donor’s awareness that organ donation is an
heroic act and such generosity may save one or more lives.328
6. International Cooperation
There is a common interest throughout the world in organ procurement.329 For example,
patients might attempt to get put on waiting lists in multiple different countries.330 No matter
what organ procurement system is implemented, achieving common standards is a desirable
approach in order to be productive and cost effective.331 While most organs will be used in the
same country, if not the same region, some international exchange would be useful for urgent
cases or difficult tissue matches.332 Clinicians need to be confident in the screening and retrieval
systems from other countries, and for these reasons, cooperation should be established
internationally, either by agreement or some type of international organization.333 Such
organization would improve training standards, allow for the exchange of experience, and
establish the ethical standards and safety of the organs, thus making organ donation an improved
process overall.334
As stated earlier, UNOS functions to facilitate organ donation and transplantation while
keeping a national waiting list in the United States.335 International organization would take on
some form of UNOS, but at an international level. Mirroring Eurotransplant’s efforts in
maintaining an international wait list would also prove beneficial. For example, the wait lists
would be separated by region, but one large database would hold all of the names and profiles.
This one enormous entity would help ensure that each and every organ is put to good use.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In 1994, the Green family was vacationing in Italy when the world stopped turning.336
Seven-year-old Nicholas was shot by a gang of bandits and two days later was declared brain
dead.337 Despite such a terrible ordeal, the Green family chose to give life by donating their little
boy’s organs and consequently saved seven lives:
a mother who had never seen her baby’s face clearly; a diabetic who had been repeatedly in
comas; a boy of 15, wasting away with a heart disease, who was only the same size as a seven
year old; a keen sportsman whose vision was gradually darkening; and two children hooked up
to dialysis machines several hours a week. Then there was Maria Pia, a vivacious 19-year old
girl who the night Nicholas was shot was dying too. Now, against all odds, she’s healthy, is
married and has two children, one of whom is called Nicholas.338

Reg, Nicholas’s father, states that few potential donors realize what a powerful gift they have to
give: they can save others from the devastation they face themselves.339 While this does not
take away the pain of the loss, donor families are proud of their loved ones, who so bravely
saved someone when no one else in the world could.340 “Donor families often wonder how there
could be any other choice.”341
In the United States alone, 200,000 useful organs “are consigned to the maggots for ready
conversion to swill” each year.342 Even more perverse is the reality that the law indulges us in
this way of life while thousands, if not millions, beg for these wasted parts.343 Organ donation
progress will depend more on legal aspects than medical advances.344 Due to the rapid
development of medical technologies, organ transplantation has progressed so much that today
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transplants are considered “more of a matter of public expectation than a medical marvel.”345 In
1980, 685 transplants were conducted in France; twelve years later there 3,221 transplants were
conducted.346 While the transplant process itself is basically mastered, the task before us is to
find the organs and put the amazing technology to use. Any organ procurement system must
fulfill two primary goals: (1) maximizing procurement to such a degree that no shortage of
organs exists, and (2) avoiding encroachment on human rights and individual autonomy.347 A
fair and efficient system will only be achieved by reaching these goals simultaneously.348
Throughout the entire world, no organ procurement policy has been successful in
supplying the amount of organs that we need to save precious lives. Every piece of legislation
that has been tested and tried has blatantly failed. While society worries that selling organs or
providing financial incentives is unethical, society should consider how ethical it is to watch
innocent people die in their hospital beds and do nothing to remedy the situation when there are
remedies available. Providing financial incentives can be done in a positive and ethical manner.
A regulated organ market would increase the supply while eliminating the black market that
society fears so much. The laws of all countries need reform. In addition, all countries need to
unite and work together to be most efficient in matching donors and recipients and being most
cost effective. Most notably, the UAGA and NOTA need to be revamped here in the United
States, as do the attitudes of the Council of Europe and the World Health Organization abroad.
In addition, an international form of UNOS or Eurotransplant needs to be implemented to
facilitate the most successful organ donations. While we have tried alternative procurement
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systems, such as presumed consent and conscription, they have failed. The world needs to try
something new; anything new. Reform is overdue.
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